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LOVE, EQUALITY, AND CORRUPTION 
Zephyr Teachout* 
INTRODUCTION 
What is corruption?  Unless one takes an absolute (and hard to defend) 
view of words’ meanings—there is a fixed meaning, it cannot differ—this 
question can mean different things.  What has it meant in the past?  What 
has it meant to judges?  What social function does the word play?  Does it 
have any meaning at all, or is it just another word for a different idea?  Does 
the meaning it had historically have any coherence?  Does the meaning it 
has now have any coherence?  What do most people think it means?  What 
do most scholars think, or most lawyers, or most U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices? 
When we debate the meaning of corruption, these different questions 
often overlap with each other and get confused.  In my book, Corruption in 
America, I primarily focus on the question, what has “corruption” meant in 
the past in America? and, relatedly, why did that meaning change in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, if not elsewhere?1  In this Article, I 
focus on corruption’s social function, a social function that I think is 
positive and helpful in American political life. 
My essential argument—where I disagree with both Professors Richard 
Hasen and Lawrence Lessig2—is that the word “corruption” retains a moral 
sense, an accusatory sense, and that this is a good thing.  I believe the deep 
core of corruption involves personal, moral failure. 
I.  DEFINING CORRUPTION 
Let me start by stating my key definitions: 
 
 An act is corrupt if it is done for narrow, selfish interests and not 
corrupt if it is done for the public good. 
 
*  Zephyr Teachout, Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.  Thanks to my 
constant colleagues in understanding democracy, Lawrence Lessig and Richard Hasan.  This 
Article is part of a symposium entitled Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad held at 
Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see Jed 
Handelsman Shugerman, Foreword:  Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (2015). 
 
 1. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA:  FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF 
BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014). 
 2. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Why Isn’t Congress More Corrupt?:  A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (2015); Lawrence Lessig, Corrupt and Unequal, Both, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 445 (2015). 
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 A person is corrupt if she routinely orients her acts in the public 
sphere toward narrow, selfish interests and not for the public 
good. 
 
 An institution is corrupt if it is designed to serve the public good 
and instead serves narrow public interests. 
 
As these definitions show, I believe that corruption requires talking about 
questions of motive, intent, feeling, and passion.  It requires, in essence, us 
to pull back the hood of the external person and directly engage in what she 
wants—not just what she is doing, but why she is doing it.  I argue that this 
is what corruption has always meant; that it is a language that comes from 
Aristotle, who understood corruption in these terms, and that modern efforts 
to strip this fundamental psychological and internal understanding of 
corruption has political effects. 
According to Professor Hasen, corruption is really another word for 
political inequality.3  According to Professor Lessig, corruption in our 
democracy exists when there is a dependency that makes institutions serve 
purposes different from that which they were designed to serve.4  They 
have notably, repeatedly, and fruitfully tussled in several forums, 
disagreeing about whether the language of corruption is appropriate. 
Both of them veer away from sentences like “Bank of America is corrupt 
for donating money to get a private tax benefit” or “Senator _____ is 
corrupt for accepting the donation and putting Bank of America’s interest 
over that of the general public.” 
In short, the biggest difference between my own definition and that of 
most of my colleagues is that I believe that questions of corruption 
necessarily implicate the self, the essence of the person or institution—its 
soul, if you will.  Sometimes you can better understand the disagreement by 
comparing the opposites of each definition of corruption.  For me, the 
opposite of corruption is love for the public; for Professor Hasen, the 
opposite of corruption is political equality; and for Professor Lessig, the 
opposite of corruption is independence. 
Of course, there is substantial overlap between these views.  One could 
even argue that they come to the same thing, but I disagree.  The argument 
that they are essentially the same goes something like this:  if you believe 
that rulers ought to love the public, you believe they ought to love them 
equally, and a gross love for one member of the public over all other 
members would not only be a betrayal of the love principle, but also a 
betrayal of the equality principle.  Equality is embedded in the principle of 
love for the public; therefore, equality is the same as love for the public. 
But this ignores actual human nature, which I believe we cannot ignore in 
political design, let alone political philosophy.  I believe that it matters what 
 
 3. See generally Hasen, supra note 2. 
 4. See generally Lessig, supra note 2. 
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someone actually, not tactically, orients themselves toward.  Take, for 
instance, a congressmember who goes into office in order to become rich.  
In order to become rich, he must first become popular.  In order to become 
popular, he chooses the strategy of appearing to care about all equally and 
in fact makes equality his campaign theme and his political platform.  But 
deep in his heart, every morning, he wakes up thinking about how wealthy 
he will become when he retires and gets a job as a lobbyist.  Compare this 
congressmember to a different congressmember who makes the exact same 
strategic choice to make equality a campaign theme, but does so because 
she deeply cares about the constituents and strives to love and care for them 
equally because of that love.  In Hasen’s or Lessig’s view, these two are 
interchangeable.  In my view, they are fundamentally different creatures, 
and a leadership constituted of the first kind is deeply unstable and likely to 
collapse at any moment. 
There are two primary reasons I disagree with my colleagues.  The first is 
the deep history of the word in political theory.  The second is social 
function.  I briefly touch on Aristotle and then turn to the social function of 
the word. 
Aristotle is the essential source of the concept of corruption in modern 
political theory.  Aristotle created the six types of government, a typology 
whose shadow we still live under.5  According to Aristotle, the difference 
between a corrupt government and its noncorrupt counterpart is the 
orientation of the love and attention of the holder, or holders, of power.6 
Recall that the corrupt monarch in Aristotle’s typology is the tyrant, and 
the corrupt aristocracy is the oligarchy.7  The difference between tyranny 
and monarchy lies in the soul of the monarch and who the monarch feels 
and believes he (then it was largely he) is trying to serve.  The difference 
between the aristocracy and the oligarchy is not whether there is a formal 
mechanical difference in voting styles, but whether the elite club in power 
attempts at every turn to serve themselves or attempts to serve others.  
Corruption is selfishness in the public sphere, egotism, and a misplaced 
sense that because one has formal power, one can use that formal power for 
private ends.  The phrase “might makes right” itself exudes a corrupt 
ideology, because it suggests that rightness flows from power, not from 
whether one serves the public. 
Monarchy and aristocracy aside, the two types of government Aristotle 
referenced that make clearest my difference with both Professor Lessig and 
Professor Hasen are the polity and the democracy.  The polity is the 
noncorrupt, virtuous form; the polity is when there is rule by the public, and 
that mass rule is defined by the use of power in service of the love of the 
public.  The democracy is the corrupt form, according to Aristotle, where 
demagogues rule using collective power for private ends.8 
 
 5. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, at 179–83 (Longman, Green, and Co. ed., W.E. Bolland 
trans., 1877) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
 6. See id. at 179. 
 7. See id. at 180–81. 
 8. See id. 
456 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Aristotle, then, in his formulation, burrowed right into our souls, delving 
into what the rulers actually believe—addressing, at heart, who they love.  
This does not strike me as far from where most people who participate in 
American political society find themselves. 
Now let us look at the social role of corruption:  how it feels to use the 
word and how it relates to our sense of character.  To say someone is 
“corrupt” is different than saying that they are “tall,” although both are 
adjectives.  “Corruption” is a different kind of word than “soccer,” though 
both are nouns.  It necessarily invokes morality, judgment, and disapproval.  
The word implicitly expresses a vision of undesirable human behavior and 
also creates a space for imagining desirable, possible, and good human 
political behavior. 
Corruption, in this way, is an essential part of political grammar in a 
democracy.  Corruption helps describe the bounds of what a faithful public 
servant or citizen will do.  When applied to people in the political context, 
the use of the word “corrupt” suggests some range of appropriate political 
behavior.  When applied to governments or institutions, it suggests a range 
of appropriate ways that those governments or institutions should function.  
Even if there is no exact agreement about its bounds—and the disputes at 
the borders are fascinating—the word “corrupt,” unlike, say, the word 
“unequal,” suggests a range of appropriate political behavior with bad 
actors and good actors, as well as a range of appropriate power structures, 
both moral and immoral.  When the inappropriate behavior, person, or 
power structure is given the adjective “corrupt,” it is not merely clumsy or 
awkward—it is soiled.  If something is outside that appropriate range, civic 
condemnation follows.  For example, while the difference between a “gift” 
and a “bribe” may depend upon a theory about the appropriate kinds of 
relationships between those in power and those out of power, the difference 
between calling something a “gift” and a “bribe” is the difference between 
calling someone morally good (or neutral) and morally bad.  That means 
that corruption enables shunning.  The corrupt person might not be invited 
to a dinner party; the corrupt government might not be invited to engage in 
an international treaty. 
Labeling someone or something as corrupt plays a distinct social 
function.  Let us say, for instance, we are persuaded by Professor Hasen that 
corruption is really a subset of concerns about political equality,9 and we try 
to shift our language to his language.  Try to replace the adjective “corrupt” 
with an adjectival string using the word “political inequality”—it becomes 
clumsy and loses some moral force.  “The Senator is corrupt” sounds 
different than “[t]he Senator failed to consider every constituent’s interest 
with equal weight.”  Both are serious charges, but I would argue that the 
corruption language is more personally damning than the inequality 
language.  Something happens around corruption and the language of 
corruption that is worth paying attention to.  Consider the activist sphere:  a 
 
 9. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 441. 
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chant to “throw the corrupt bums out!” has the power of accusation and 
morality within it in a different way than “throw the preferential bums out!” 
When one talks about the scope of obligations and the failure to act for 
those obligations without the language of corruption, the conversation 
becomes different and, I would argue, more emotionally dry. 
Another way to illustrate this is to borrow the language of fiduciary 
obligation and replace “corruption” with the fiduciary language.  The public 
condemnatory language used in association with corruption theory is simply 
stronger.  It is easy to say, “I hope my friend stops seeing that person; she’s 
corrupt” and slightly less powerful to say, “I hope my friend stops seeing 
that person; she fails to live up to her fiduciary duties to her constituents.” 
Naming a potentially socially acceptable act as “corrupt” has a moral 
force separate from the legal force and brings the kind of shame closer to 
that associated with treason, sexual promiscuity (historically), or racism (in 
the contemporary culture).  Regardless of whether a particular activity is 
against the law, to call something corrupt is to call it a moral crime, and the 
accusation carries with it a special kind of blame—a blame of the actor, not 
just the act.  The naming of something as corrupt asks for a kind of social 
abandonment of the person or the institution associated with the word.  It is 
different, in all these ways, than a word like “idiotic” or “irrational.”  The 
word “irrational” is also negative, also an insult, but no matter how often it 
is used, it is not integral to political grammar in the way “corruption” is.  
And, even when it is an insult, it is not a moral insult and does not call into 
question the character of the person or institution called irrational.  
Relatedly, there is a cathartic effect of using the term “corruption”—the 
accusation of corruption gives some power to the accuser.  As I argued in 
Corruption in America, the ability to call a public official corrupt arguably 
reveals an authority of the citizen. 
II.  HOW TO DEAL WITH SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION 
But, you might say, corruption also always has encompassed systemic 
flaws or process flaws that threaten to undermine the system by allowing 
private interests to extract subsidies from the public.  How do you deal with 
that?  Professor Lessig’s dependence model of corruption focuses largely 
on institutional failures10 in institutions constituted by “good souls.”  
Dependence corruption exists when elements inside a political institution 
become dependent upon a powerful interest outside a political institution 
that was not designed to have control over that institution. 
Professor Lessig does not entirely reject the individual crime.  He argues 
that “[e]veryone agrees [corruption] means at least quid pro quo bribery, or 
influence peddling. . . .  [C]orruption is influence exchanged for reward; 
public office traded for private gain.  To the modern American mind, no 
crime could be clearer.”11  However, he does not study those kinds of 
 
 10. See Lessig, supra note 2, at 446–47 (describing his dependence model of 
corruption). 
 11. Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61, 61 (2013). 
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corruption.  Instead, he focuses on what he calls dependence corruption:  
“the state of an institution or an individual that has developed a dependence 
different from a, or the, dependence intended or desired.”12 
According to Professor Lessig, an institution becomes corrupt when there 
are parties outside it that create dependence.13  Dependence can be personal 
or institutional; all the persons inside an institution may become dependent, 
or the entire institution may be dependent.  This dependency makes it 
impossible for the individuals or institutions to act in the best interests of 
the institution, whatever those interests may be.  In politics, a dependence 
outside of the public creates a conflict in the loyalties of a politician.  A 
candidate may be completely dependent upon donors to get elected.  That 
dependence compromises and corrupts her ability to represent her 
community. 
Professor Lessig uses the example of the judge whose campaign was 
supported by a $3 million independent expenditure while the judge was 
considering a case that impacted the spending party.  He argues: 
Justice Benjamin was formally independent of Blankenship.  Blankenship 
didn’t hire him.  He had no power to fire him.  Benjamin received his 
salary from the state.  Nothing Blankenship could do would change the 
size of that salary, or the speed with which it grew.  In a strictly formal 
sense, Benjamin was an independent judge whose decision in this matter 
could not be controlled by the litigant Blankenship. 
 But no one who is genuinely concerned about independence—or 
maybe better, improper dependence—would limit considerations to 
formal independence alone.14 
This, he argues, is an inappropriate dependency.15  The intuition of 
dependence corruption applies to election-related fundraising, where a set 
of funders becomes entirely essential to a candidate’s success.  In each case, 
one would have to conclude that the person in elected office was 
necessarily, as a structural matter, dependent.  Corruption would exist even 
if those funders never demanded anything, but regularly voted their 
conscience, because their conscience (which is not the conscience of the 
public) would have the ability to direct who got elected and, through that, 
the policies that they chose to pursue.  A candidate might have a choice to 
reject their funding, but because no candidate could get elected without 
their funding, such a choice is not a meaningful or serious one.  In this 
model, contracts (exchanges) could create a subset of dependencies but are 
not necessary or sufficient for dependency.  The dependency analysis is 
finally an analysis of power, and corruption means that power is allocated in 
the wrong place in a political society, according to the society’s own terms. 
 
 12. Id. at 65. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 104, 105 (2009). 
 15. Id. 
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Supreme Court cases have also used dependence corruption (sometimes 
at the same time as using quid pro quo corruption).  In Davis v. FEC,16 the 
Court said that burdening a candidate’s expenditure of his own funds on his 
own campaign does not further the State’s anticorruption interest.17  Indeed, 
the Court stated that “reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of 
corruption,”18 because “the use of personal funds . . . reduces the 
candidate’s dependence on outside contributions.”19 
This phrasing indicates that at least some members of the Court see 
“dependence” upon campaign contributions as a kind of corruption.  
Professor Lessig argues that “a representative democracy that developed a 
competing dependency, conflicting with the dependency upon the people, 
would be ‘corrupt.’”20  Representatives “depend” on sources of private 
wealth, so that they can be reelected, but in so doing they weaken the 
integrity of the system.21 
This dependency constrains action and undermines the institution.  
Professor Lessig argues that dependency alone is not corrupting, but 
inappropriate dependencies are corrupting:  if an institution is designed to 
be dependent upon the will of a handful of people, but is, in fact, dependent 
upon the will of a second group of people, that institution is corrupt.  If the 
institution is dependent upon the set of people for whom it was designed to 
be dependent, the institution is not corrupt. 
The essential move in Professor Lessig’s formulation is the move away 
from individual indictment.  A public officer who is dependent is not 
corrupt, he argues, but a system that encourages and requires this kind of 
dependency is corrupt.  Therefore, one can still use the language of 
corruption to describe what happens when private interests predominate, 
but the corruption attaches to the system, not the individuals.  Effectively, 
he argues that, if corruption is necessary to get a job, it no longer becomes a 
corrupt act to engage in that system. 
I have previously explained why I think morality is an essential part of 
the understanding of corruption in the personal sense.  What I think Lessig’s 
account lacks is an explanation of why we would use the same condemning 
word to describe something fundamentally different in the structural sphere.  
Looking at its social function, I think that the function of saying “the 
college is corrupt” or “Congress is corrupt” implicitly involves some of the 
relevant actors either being corrupting or corrupted in the personal sense, so 
 
 16. 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 17. Id. at 741 (stating that “discouraging [the] use of personal funds[] disserves the 
anti-corruption interest”). 
 18. Id. at 740–41. 
 19. Id. at 738 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976)).  The Court in Buckley 
v. Valeo reasoned that “the use of personal funds reduces the candidate’s dependence on 
outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant 
risks of abuse” of money in politics. 424 U.S. at 53. 
 20. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST:  HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT 128 (2011). 
 21. Id. at 141–42. 
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that there is a deep entanglement between the personal and institutional 
accusation. 
III.  WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
All three of us agree that we need publicly financed elections.  We all are 
suspect of the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC.22  There is very 
little we disagree on.  So why does it matter? 
My definition is actually grounded in a political pragmatism—my own 
belief that without moral language that engages moral sentiments, two 
things become extremely difficult.  The first is the equal treatment of the 
public.  I believe that the inequality in treatment of the public is almost 
inevitable without love, and equality in treatment is only enabled by love.  
Although there are critical factors that help create this love, we must engage 
the moral sentiments.  In practice, few people will actually be equality 
oriented and selfish at the same time.  So it is not so much that equal 
treatment is impossible without love, but that it is far less likely.  So as a 
practical and not theoretical matter, this human engagement with the nature 
of desire actually matters. 
Second, it is difficult, although not impossible, to engage political change 
without using the accusatory and moral language of corruption.  Corruption 
has been the bugle cry in some of the most important moments of political 
change.  People respond very powerfully to wrongness, to immorality, and, 
in particular, to personal immorality (an individual is corrupt or was 
corrupted)—arguably more powerfully than they respond to the language of 
political equality.  Or rather, because I also believe in the power of the 
rhetoric of political equality, they respond to both best when there is both a 
moral condemnation and a moral vision, blended together. 
But the most essential reason I disagree with Professor Hasen and 
Professor Lessig is because I believe that the human condition—the human 
heart—is capable of public love, but only if there is a grammar and public 
support for that kind of love.  Patriotism, love of country—that exists, that 
is real. 
Another reason it matters is that the more you understand that corruption 
is actually fundamentally a moral accusation, the easier it is to understand 
that anticorruption laws are necessarily over- and underinclusive and not 
designed to actually criminalize corruption so much as make corruption less 
likely. 
The law of corruption can never exactly match acts of corruption, but is 
always going to be, in essence, prophylactic.  It will always be both over- 
and underinclusive because, while law is good at many things, digging into 
the heart to discover why we give a campaign contribution, a bottle of wine, 
or a car, is not something the law is particularly good at.  In other words, 
while a jury might be able—with real difficulty—to determine that the 
bottle of wine was given in order to influence a public act, it is almost 
 
 22. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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impossible for a jury to determine whether the desire for influence came 
from a desire for the good of the public or a narrow, selfish desire. 
Because of this, the primary job of structuring a system to prevent 
corruption must necessarily focus on areas where structural conflicts of 
interest are present.  For instance, a law preventing a lawmaker from having 
outside income from interests directly affected by his decisions is a law that 
is necessarily both over- and underinclusive, but it is an essential 
anticorruption law.  There are some lawmakers who are capable of being a 
lawyer for, say, Boeing and then not treating Boeing any differently when 
Boeing is asking for a tax break.  However, the law preventing these 
conflicts makes corruption less likely. 
A law prohibiting revolving doors does the same thing.  Over half of the 
members of Congress now go on to lobby when leaving Congress.23  Some 
of them may be capable of being in Congress without giving a greater 
weight to their potential future employers, but others will not, and so the 
revolving door law is needed.  It will never cover all instances, because 
there are plenty of shadow lobbying jobs that are not covered by the 
prohibition. 
But even an extortion or a bribery law, intended to apply only to those 
individuals who have transgressed in a particular way, is essentially 
prophylactic under my definition.  That is because a person who gives a $10 
million car in an explicit deal to a politician in exchange for changing a law 
might be doing so for publicly oriented reasons or for narrow, selfish 
reasons.  However, laws against giving gifts with intent to influence 
political behavior make it far less likely that selfish behavior will be 
present. 
CONCLUSION 
While we may want to root out corruption, there is no world without 
corruption and, in fact, no political world in which it is not everywhere.  
People in and out of power will always serve their own interests.  Our goal 
then is to build a system with as much public orientation as possible and as 
little corruption as possible—not a fantasy world without any corruption at 
all.  The goal of anticorruption laws is both to protect and build a political 
culture that cherishes and nourishes love for the public.  Some of these laws 
also serve the end of enabling greater political equality.  And that is also an 
essential democratic value and the value that democracy adds. 
The primary reason for passing laws against limits on campaign spending 
may have to do with the value of political equality, the basic idea that each 
person’s interest should be valued equally.  This is an extremely powerful 
and essential democratic idea.  I support this idea.  It is, I would argue, one 
of the key reasons behind most of the laws that we want. 
 
 23. Revolving Door:  Former Members of the 113th Congress, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/departing.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http:// 
perma.cc/K8PG-GLQL]. 
